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 Ahmet Ertugrul and Faruk Selcuk
 A Brief Account of the Turkish
 Economy, 1980-2000
 The Turkish economy has experienced relatively high inflation and unsuc
 cessful disinflation programs during the past thirty years. Although yearly
 inflation was over 100 percent in certain years, it has never reached to
 hyperinflationary levels, but increased in a stepwise fashion by the time: An
 average annual inflation rate of 20 percent in the 1970s, 35 to 40 percent in
 the early 1980s, 60 to 65 percent in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and
 around 80 percent before the government launched yet another disinflationary
 program in 1998 (see Figure 1).
 An early attempt to reduce inflation on a permanent basis and to put the
 economy on a sustainable growth path began on January 24, 1980. The gov
 ernment declared its intention to liberalize the economy and to pursue an
 export-led growth policy. After the implementation of the program, a mili
 tary regime was installed in September 1980. The January 24 program reached
 its initial targets very soon in terms of a lower inflation, a higher gross do
 mestic product (GDP) growth, and a relatively liberalized external trade re
 gime and financial system. However, after the general elections and a new
 parliament in 1984, inflation started to rise again.
 The basic elements of disinflation efforts in the late 1980s were in various
 forms of nominal anchoring and monetary tightening without any serious
 effort to reduce the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR). This policy
 necessitated a higher interest rate on domestic assets and a lower deprecia
 tion rate so that the short-term capital inflow would be secured. Especially
 after 1989 (the year capital account was liberalized), the new disinflationary
 strategy, based on monetary tightening and real appreciation, pronounced
 Ahmet Ertugrul and Faruk Selguk are assistant professors of economics at Bilkent
 University, Ankara, Turkey.
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 Figure 1. Inflation and Real Exchange Rate in Turkey
 (a) Yearly Inflation (CPI) (b) Monthly Inflation (CPI)
 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
 (c) CPI in US Dollars (d) Real Exchange Rate Index
 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
 Years Years
 Sources: Central Bank of Turkey (2001); Reuters (December 2000); State Institute of
 Statistics (2001).
 Notes: (a) Annual inflation, consumer price index (CPI) (percent), (b) Monthly inflation,
 CPI (seasonally adjusted, percent), (c) CPI in U.S. dollar terms, 1994 = 100. (d) The real
 exchange rate index published by Reuters, TRTWIN, 1987 = 100. An increase in the real
 exchange rate index indicates an appreciation of the Turkish lira.
 itself much more strongly. However, the government did not take necessary
 measures on the fiscal front and the disinflationary attempts by the monetary
 policymakers were futile. Due to the unsustainable nature of the fiscal policy
 and the external deficit, the economy experienced a major crisis in early
 1994. The government announced a new stabilization program on April 5,
 1994, and a stand-by arrangement was approved by the International Mon
 etary Fund (IMF) Board two months after the program started. However, it
 soon became clear that the government was not strongly behind the April 5
 program and the stand-by agree ent came to an end in 1995. During the
 following two years, there was no serious attempt to stabilize the economy
 and to reduce inflation.
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 In July 1998, the Turkish government started another disinflation pro
 gram under the guidance of an IMF Staff Monitored Program (SMP). The
 program achieved some improvements concerning inflation rate and fiscal
 imbalances but it could not relieve the pressures on the interest rates. The
 Russian crisis in August 1998, the general elections in April 1999, and two
 devastating earthquakes in August and October 1999 deteriorated the fiscal
 balance of the public sector.1
 The government started implementing another far-reaching restructuring
 and reform program after the general elections in April 1999. The aim of the
 program was to reduce inflation from its current 60 to 70 percent per year to
 single digits by the end of 2002. The program gained further momentum
 after the country made a stand-by agreement with the IMF in December
 1999. The main tool of the disinflation program has been the adoption of a
 crawling peg regime, that is, the percent change in the Turkish lira value of
 a basket of foreign exchanges ($1.00 plus 0.70) is fixed for a year and one
 half period. Although there was a turmoil in financial markets in late No
 vember and early December 2000, the program seemed to be on track as of
 February 2001, thanks to a substantial additional fund from the IMF after the
 crisis in December 2000. This short-lived financial crisis showed that the fi
 nancial system is very fragile. Ironically, the crisis made it clear that the
 continuation of the disinflation program and the stability of the banking sys
 tem in the short run depends on short-term capital inflows. Therefore, unless
 the government creates an environment in which the foreign direct invest
 ment finds itself comfortable, the program is probably destined to fail and
 inflation might start to rise again.
 The aim of this paper is to give an overall account of the Turkish economy
 during 1980-2000.2 The growth performance of the economy is presented in
 the next section. The external balance and foreign trade developments are
 reported in the third section. The fiscal position and domestic debt dynamics
 are reviewed in the fourth section. And finally, after a detailed overview of
 the Turkish banking sector in the fifth section, we conclude.
 Growth Performance: Boom-Bust Cycle
 The export-led growth strategy of the early 1980s was quite successful. The
 average annual growth rate of the real GDP was an impressive 5.8 percent
 between 1981 and 1988 and the economy did not experience any recession,
 making the country an exemplary one in annual reports of international fi
 nancial institutions such as the IMF. Also, the real increase in industrial pro
 duction was above the GDP growth; it averaged 8.1 percent during the same
 period.
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 Figure 2. Real Growth in the Turkish Economy: Percentage Change in the GDP
 and Economic Activities at Producers' Prices (at 1987 prices)
 (a) Real GDP growth (b) Industry
 1980 1987 1994 2001 1980 1987 1994 2001
 (c) Agriculture (d) Domestic Trade
 1980 1987 1994 2001 1980 1987 1994 2001
 Years Years
 Source: State Institute of Statistics (2001).
 Notes: (a) Real GDP growth (percent), (b) Industrial production, (c) Agriculture, (d) Do
 mestic trade.
 Starting in 1988, the economy entered into a new phase and the growth
 performance has been sluggish since then, with two minor and two major
 recessions. The annual real GDP growth averaged 3.7 percent during this
 period. The average annual growth rate of industrial production was slightly
 higher: 4.4 percent (see Figure 2). The exemplary economy of the 1980s
 became a textbook case of "boom-bust" growth performance with a rela
 tively lower average growth rate and a high volatility in the 1990s.
 The dynamics of the growth performance of the Turkish economy after
 1989 can be linked to unsuccessful disinflationary efforts and debt-financing
 policies of the government, pronouncing themselves in the exchange rate
 policy. The Turkish policymakers started to slow down the depreciation rate
 of the Turkish lira, in part to control inflation, but mainly to be able to easily
 borrow from the domestic markets in 1989. Although there was a crisis in
 1994, which interrupted this policy, the Turkish authorities have pursued the
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 same exchange rate policy for the last ten years. As Calvo and Vegh (1999)
 and Guidotti and Vegh (1999) show, the credibility of a slowed-down de
 valuation in fighting inflation in moderate to high inflation economies is al
 most always low, both because of inflation inertia and because of the failure
 of the previous disinflation programs. The developments in the Turkish
 economy after 1987 are in line with stylized facts from exchange rate-based
 stabilization programs in different economies, summarized in Calvo and Vegh
 (1999):
 1. Slow convergence of the inflation rate (measured by the consumer price
 index [CPI]) to the rate of change in exchange rates.
 2. Initial increase in real activity?particularly, real GDP and private con
 sumption?followed by a counteraction.
 3. Real appreciation of the domestic currency.
 4. Deterioration of the current account balance.
 5. A decrease in domestic ex-post interest rates in initial stages.
 Possible explanations for an initial increase in real activity followed by a
 counteraction in exchange rate-based stabilization programs is given in Calvo
 and Vegh (1999). At the initial stage of slowed-down depreciation, interest
 rate parity condition leads to a lower domestic interest rate. If the convergence
 of inflation is slow, the real interest rate will fall as well, leading to an increase
 in domestic demand, especially in private durable and semi-durable goods
 consumption and private investment. Eventually, a reduction in consumption
 and investment and a real depreciation is inevitable because of the resource
 constraints. As a result, the economy experiences a recession right before or
 immediately after the program ends. If the economy goes through several
 "slowed-down depreciation-correction" cycles, the overall economic activity
 will also experience boom-bust cycles. The amplitude of these cycles will be
 higher if the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is high in the economy.3
 With regard to economic growth after 1987, there were four recessions in
 Turkey: 1989,1991, 1994, and 1999 (see Figure 2). Both the 1991 and 1994
 recessions were preceded by a substantial increase in the real exchange rate
 (an appreciation, see Figure 1). Also, private-durable and semi-durable goods
 consumption and private investment were well above their trend values be
 fore those recessions (see Figure 3).
 The last recession, in 1999, was mainly caused by the response of mon
 etary authorities to the Russian crisis in late 1998 and two devastating earth
 quakes in 1999. The real interest rates were kept higher to defend the Turkish
 lira for a considerable period of time after the Russian crisis. Nevertheless, it
 is worth noting that there was a small appreciation (approximately 10 per
 cent) from January 1996 until the Russian crisis in July 1998. During this
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 Figure 3. Cyclical Movements of the Real GDP Components in Turkey
 (a) Durable Consumption (b) Semi-durable Consumption
 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 1 987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
 (c) Private Investment (d) External Deficit
 0.2 p-:-1-:- -;-r-l 1500p-;-;-!
 Years Years
 Source: State Institute of Statistics (2001).
 Notes: (a) Private sector durable goods consumption (deviations from logarithmic trend).
 (b) Private sector semi-durable goods consumption (deviations from logarithmic trend).
 (c) Private sector investment expenditure (deviations from logarithmic trend), (d) External
 deficit (deviations from the sample mean). Calculated from the Expenditure on the GDP (at
 1987 prices). Series are filtered to remove seasonalities.
 period, we observe again a boom in both private consumption and private
 investment. Since the recent disinflationary program also relies on a slowed
 down depreciation policy, it was reasonable to expect another boom-bust
 cycle in economic activity starting in 2000, regardless of the outcome of the
 program. If the slowdown in economic activity arrives relatively early, it
 might be a real concern for the government, and the program might come to
 an unexpected end.
 External Balance
 With the introduction of a comprehensive stabilization program in January
 1980, an outward-oriented development strategy was accepted and external
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 balance became a major concern of the governments as protracted current
 account imbalances for the previous three decades made the governments
 more sensitive about the sustainability of external imbalances.
 The export-led growth policy was quite successful at the early stages of
 its implementation. The openness of the economy increased immediately:
 The ratio of total exports to GDP increased from 4.1 to 13.3 percent during
 the period 1980-1988. The ratio of total imports to GDP also increased, but
 the rate of increase was smaller, as it rose from 11.3 to 16.4 percent during
 the same period. Therefore, the external balance situation improved signifi
 cantly. The ratio of external deficit to GDP fell from 7 percent in 1980 to -1
 percent (surplus) in 1988. The real depreciation of the Turkish lira (approxi
 mately 40 percent) and several tax incentives to exporters in this period were
 the major driving forces of the export-led growth policy.4
 The policy reversal after 1987 had an adverse effect on the external bal
 ance situation of the economy. Because of the slowed-down depreciation,
 the Turkish lira appreciated in real terms 22 percent in 1989 and continued to
 appreciate in 1990 at a slower rate. Consequently, the total exports slowed
 down and total imports increased. The ratio of external deficit to GDP in
 creased to 2 percent in 1989, and to 4 percent in 1990. Although there was a
 slight decrease in 1991 and 1992, the external deficit reached to approxi
 mately 6 percent of the GDP in 1993 (see Figure 4).5 Toward the end of
 1993, it was clear that the fiscal policy and external balance situation was
 not sustainable. In January 1994, international credit rating agencies low
 ered Turkey's sovereign debt rating to below investment grade. This trig
 gered a panic in financial markets. The Turkish lira was devaluated twice, in
 January 1994 and April 1994. The total exports increased dramatically,
 whereas the total imports dropped. As a result, the external balance was posi
 tive in 1994 (1 percent of the GDP).
 Between April 1994 and December 1994, the Turkish lira appreciated
 significantly in real terms (22 percent in five months) and the corrective
 nature of the devaluation during the first half of the year disappeared. Ac
 cording to the national income statistics, the external deficit was 5 percent of
 the GDP in 1995 and approximately 6 percent in 1996 and 1997. However,
 the worsening external balance situation did not result in large current ac
 count deficits in these years.6 The external deficits in 1998 and 1999 were
 relatively low, thanks to extremely high real interest rates after the Russian
 crisis and a shrink in total demand. It is clear that the total exports are stag
 nant since 1996, around $26 billion, and the total imports are dominating the
 current account dynamics.
 The capital account of the balance-of-payments indicates that the Turkish
 economy became dependent on short-term capital flows, especially after 1989
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 (c) Export and Imports - GDP (d) External Deficit - GDP
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
 Years Years
 Source: State Institute of Statistics (2001).
 Notes: (a) Exports (US$ billion), (b) Imports (US$ billion), (c) Export-import ratio,
 (d) External deficit in percent of GDP (external deficit figures are taken from the national
 income accounts of the State Institute of Statistics). Export figures do not contain the
 shuttle trade estimates of the Central Bank. See footnote 3 on unofficial exports and
 imports.
 (see Figure 5). Foreign direct investment (net) was extremely low until 1988.
 Since then, there was a surge in foreign direct investment, reaching $800
 million in 1992 from $100 million in 1987. The foreign direct investment
 averaged $600 million between 1993 and 1998 and became low again dur
 ing the last two years as a result of long-term capital outflows (investment by
 domestic residents abroad). Overall, it is safe to conclude that the Turkish
 economy has not been able to attract significant foreign direct investment for
 the last twenty years. The total foreign direct investment during the last fif
 teen years was $7.7 billion, roughly equivalent to total long-term borrowing
 by the private sector (excluding banks) in just one year (1999). Another no
 ticeable development in long-term capital figures is the surge in the "Other
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 Figure 5. Capital Flows
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 Source: Central Bank of Turkey (2001).
 Notes: (a) Foreign direct investment (US$ billion), (b) Portfolio investment (US$ billion),
 (c) Other long-term capital (US$ billion), (d) Short-term capital (US$ billion). All figures
 are net.
 Long-Term Capital" item, starting in 1996 (see Figure 5). A close inspection
 of the statistics reveals that the private sector (excluding banks) has increased
 its external borrowing for the last five years. This development signals the
 fact that the foreign exchange exposure of the country is increasing. Total
 external debt figures confirm this conclusion. The outstanding external debt
 was $79.6 billion in 1996. The same figure is $106.9 billion in 2000(Q3),
 indicating a 34 percent increase in four years. The composition of the exter
 nal debt has also changed. In 1996, only 21 percent of the total debt had a
 short-term maturity, whereas it is 25 percent in 2000(Q3). The share of com
 mercial banks in short-term external debt is 60 percent ($15.6 billion). The
 private sector, excluding banks, carries 38 percent ($10.5 billion) of the short
 term debt. Incidentally, the total short-term external debt of the country is
 roughly equivalent to the total reserves of the Central Bank.
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 Figure 6. Public Sector Borrowing Requirement and Financing
 (a) PSBR-GNP (b) Domestic Borrowirtg-GNP
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
 (c) Foreign Borrowing-GNP (d) Primary Deficit-GNP
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
 Years Years
 Source: State Planning Organization (2001).
 Notes: (a) PSBR in percent of GNP. (b) Domestic borrowing in percent of GNP. (c) Foreign
 borrowing in percent of GNP. (d) Primary surplus in percent of GNP.
 Fiscal Balance and Domestic Debt
 The PSBR in Turkey consists of six components?central government, ex
 tra-budgetary funds, local authorities, state economic enterprises, social se
 curity institutions, and revolving funds.7 Following the January 24 program,
 the PSBR as a percent of the gross national product (GNP) decreased im e
 diately, from 9 percent in 1980 to 4.5 percent in 1981, and stayed less than 5
 percent. After 1986, the PSBR started to increase in a steady fashion and
 reached 12 percent in 1993. Although there was a correction in 1994 and
 1995, it kept increasing again and reached to over 15 percent in 1999 (see
 Figure 6).
 There was not only a change in deficit dynamics, but also in deficit-fi
 nancing policies of the governments after 1987. The share of domestic bor
 rowing in PSBR financing kept increasing and the share of foreign borrowing
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 Figure 7. Daily Weighted Average of Overnight Interest Rates (simple annual,
 percent)
 1992
 Source: Central Bank of Turkey (2001).
 Notes: The overnight interest rates reached to extreme levels in 1994 and 2000. Therefore,
 these periods are excluded, (a) January 2, 1990-December 31, 1993. (b) January 2, 1995
 November 17, 2000.
 declined. After 1993, the share of foreign borrowing in PSBR financing was
 negative. As a result, the domestic debt started to increase. Right from the
 beginning of 1990, the total domestic debt dynamics in Turkey clearly indi
 cated that the fiscal policy was on an unsustainable path. (See, for example,
 Selguk and Rantanen 1996.) Total domestic debt of the government in 1988
 was a mere $4 billion. As of December 2000, the stock reached $53.8 bil
 lion. The ratio of domestic debt to GNP also increased from 6 percent in
 1988 to 30 percent in 1999. Note that this figure does not include some other
 public liabilities such as unpaid duty losses of the state banks (approximately
 $20 billion). It is hard to imagine that the domestic debt problem could be
 solved in a smooth fashion.
 The role of the Central Bank's monetary policy in debt management in
 recent years was an accommodating one.8 A close inspection of the daily
 overnight interest rates (Figure 7) preceding the IMF program reveals two
 distinct periods: A volatile period after the 1994 crisis (June 1, 1994-April
 16,1996) and a relatively less volatile period (April 17, 1996-December 31,
 1999).9 During the first period, the sample mean and the standard deviation
 of the overnight rates were 73.6 percent and 26.3 percent, respectively. The
 second period had almost the same sample mean (72.3 percent), but a much
 lower standard deviation (7.4 percent). During the stand-by period in 2000,
 the sample mean of the overnight interest rate decreased. Also, the standard
 deviation of interest rates increased, as was to be expected. The mean of
 overnight rates between January 3, 2000, and November 17, 2000, was 39
 percent and the standard deviation was 14 percent.10 Clearly, the Central
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 Figure 8. The "Hot Money" and the Turkish Banking System
 (a) Short Positions (b) Short Position-Total Assets
 ,5-.-.-.-,-. 15.-.-.-.-r
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
 (c) Security investment-Total Assets (d) Dollar interest rate
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
 Years Years
 Source: Banks Association of Turkey; Undersecretariat of Treasury.
 Notes: (a) Foreign exchange short position of commercial banks. Short position: the
 difference between foreign exchange denominated liabilities and assets, (b) The share of
 short positions in total assets, (c) The share of security investment of commercial banks in
 their total assets, (d) Weighted average of dollar return (ex-post) from Turkish lira
 denominated Turkish treasury bills and Government bonds (domestic debt). The weighted
 rate of return was 140 percent in 1994. We restricted the vertical axis from above to make
 all years visible in plot (d).
 Bank had an implicit ceiling on overnight borrowing rates starting in April
 1996, especially after the Russian crisis in 1998 until January 2000. This
 implicit ceiling provided a cushion for the commercial banks against the in
 terest rate risk in the market, reducing their risk management capabilities. How
 ever, the average interest rate during this "ceiled interest rates" period indicates
 that it was not profitable to buy domestic debt instruments and to fund them
 from the money market. It was still the "borrowing abroad-lending home"
 strategy that left a hefty profit margin in dollar terms (see Figure 8).
 State economic enterprises are another contributing factor to the PSBR.
 Zaim and Taskin (1997) compare the performance of the public enterprise
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 sector to the private sector in Turkey and shows that the public enterprise
 sector performance deteriorated in the 1980s. Although it was always on the
 agenda of every government, privatization performance of Turkey was quite
 weak until 2000. The existing legal framework and populist policies of the
 governments were probably the main reasons for this result.11
 The Turkish Banking System
 One of the main goals of the January 24, 1980, structural-adjustment pro
 gram was the liberalization of the repressed financial system. Concerning
 the financial deregulations, the governments started to liberalize the foreign
 exchange regime, certain restrictions on capital movements were removed,
 and the convertibility of the Turkish lira was provided. Meanwhile, restric
 tions on interest rates were removed, a short-term money market was estab
 lished, the Central Bank was allowed to engage in open-market operations,
 and most of the regulations concerning the financial markets were elimi
 nated in the context of liberalization and globalization. These deregulation
 efforts sped up the linking of the domestic financial market to the rest of the
 world, and provided more competitive working conditions to the commer
 cial banks. Liberalization and integration occurred more rapidly than ex
 pected, partly due to the advances in the telecommunications sector.
 It may be asserted that liberalization and integration might improve the
 overall efficiency in the economy. However, increasing interdependence makes
 the international linkage of policy implementations more important than be
 fore. A boom or a recession in one country spills over to other countries
 through trade flows and a change in interest rates and capital movements.
 Hence, the liberalization and integration of the financial sector may also in
 crease the vulnerability of an economy to adverse shocks from the rest of the
 world. In this section, we investigate the developments in the Turkish banking
 system in three distinct periods?early liberalization efforts in the 1980s and
 developments, especially after 1987, leading to the 1994 crisis, the 1994 cri
 sis and afterward, and the 2000 disinflation program. The last subsection also
 includes an account of the November 2000 crisis in the financial markets.
 Liberalization and the Banking System
 The structural adjustment program, which was implemented in the early
 1980s, produced substantial changes in the banking sector. Starting in 1980,
 total assets of the banks increased from $18.5 billion (31 percent of the GNP)
 to $134 billion (68 percent of the GNP) by the end of 1999. The ratio of total
 deposits to GNP also increased from 15.4 percent to 61 percent during the
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 Figure 9. Developments in Public and Private Banks in Turkey
 (a) Assets-GNP  (b) Relative Asset Snares
 (c) Deposits-GNP  (d) Relative Deposit Shares
 Source: Banks Association of Turkey.
 Notes: (a) Total assets of commercial banks-nominal GNP ratio (percent), (b) Total deposits
 in commercial banks-nominal GNP ratio (percent), (c) The share of state banks (straight
 line) and the share of private banks (dotted line) in total assets, (d) The share of state banks
 (straight line) and the share of private banks (dotted line) in total deposits.
 same period (see Figure 9).12 During this period, the market share of the state
 banks (in terms of their share in total assets) gradually decreased from 44
 percent to 35 percent, and the share of private banks increased from 41 per
 cent to 50 percent. However, the state banks increased their share in total
 deposits (see Figure 9).
 Liberalization and integration efforts have created important structural
 changes in the balance sheets of the banking system, especially after 1987.
 Starting from 1987, when the government slightly changed its policy from
 the current account-based one to disinflationary efforts, the relative share of
 non-deposit funds in total liabilities of private banks permanently increased
 and reached its peak in 1993. In other words, the Turkish private banks tried
 to substitute non-deposit funds for deposits.
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 The share of foreign currency-denominated assets and liabilities started
 to increase, especially after 1987. The share of foreign currency-denomi
 nated assets in total assets rose from 26 percent in 1988 to 38 percent in
 1999. Similarly, the share of foreign currency-denominated liabilities in to
 tal liabilities rose from 25 percent in 1988 to 48 percent in 1999. Short-term
 borrowing-based deficit financing policies of the governments increased the
 interest rates and encouraged short-term capital flows into the economy. The
 new policy facilitated managing public deficit and helped the Central Bank
 to build up its foreign currency reserves. These deficit financing and reserve
 accumulation policies led commercial banks to open short positions in for
 eign currencies. The short positions in the banking system increased from
 $1.8 billion in 1990 to $5 billion in 1993. Although there was a decrease in
 1994 as a result of a financial crisis that year, the short positions of the bank
 ing system kept increasing and reached to $13.2 billion at the end of 1999
 (see Figure 8).
 A short-term borrowing-based deficit financing policy of the government
 also led the commercial banks to change their asset management policies:
 They shifted from direct loan extensions to purchasing government securi
 ties. The share of security investment of the banks in total assets increased
 from 10 percent in 1988 to 17.2 percent in 1999 (see Figure 8).
 A combination of disinflationary efforts and short-term borrowing-based
 deficit financing policies made the banking system more vulnerable against
 foreign exchange and interest rate risks. Higher interest rate commitment on
 domestic assets, lower depreciation rate, and an increase in the PSBR built
 up the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank but also opened the
 banking sector to speculative attacks. A more risk-taking behavior of the
 privately owned banks and their large short positions in foreign currency
 raised the question about the sustainability of the short-term capital inflow
 based external balance policy.
 The financial sector liberalization was completed to a great extent with
 the demise of restrictions on capital movements in 1989. In the same year,
 the Central Bank also launched a new monetary program, which prevented
 the easy access of the public sector to the Central Bank's credit lines. How
 ever, the government did not accommodate the new monetary policy by tak
 ing necessary measures in the fiscal area and the treasury kept involving in
 external as well as internal borrowing activities. High interest rates, lower
 depreciation, heavy internal and external short-term borrowing were typical
 characteristics of the financial environment between 1989 and 1994. A lower
 credit risk and a high rate of return on government bonds made the privately
 owned banks reluctant to manage the market risks. As mentioned above,
 private banks changed their global asset-liability management strategies and
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 Table 1
 Net Interest Earnings-Net Interest Expenses Ratio (NIE-NIEX); Net Profit in
 Percent of Shareholders Equity (NP-NSE) of Private Commercial Banks (in
 percent)
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
 NIE-NIEX private banks 1.41 1.55 1.57 1.86 1.66
 NP-NSE private banks 33.5 37.3 32.1 43.2 42.1
 Source: Banks Association of Turkey.
 started to operate in short positions in foreign currency-denominated assets
 since the existing policy provided enjoyable profit margins for them (see
 Figure 8). The ratio of net profit to equity and the net interest earnings to net
 interest expenses remarkably increased (see Table 1).
 Because of profitable short positions, the dollarization in the banking sys
 tem started to increase. The share of foreign currency-denominated assets in
 total assets increased from 26 percent in 1988 to 38 percent in 1999. Also,
 the share of foreign currency-denominated liabilities in total liabilities in
 creased from 25 percent to 48 percent during the same period. Because of
 the currency substitution in the economy, the deposit collection activities of
 the sector concentrated on foreign currency-denominated deposits. In pri
 vate banks, the share of foreign currency-denominated deposits in total de
 posits reached 72 percent in 1999.
 In general, the privately owned banks in Turkey prefer to increase their
 capital by adding the retained earnings to the net worth rather than by new
 equity participation. Between 1989 and 1993, relatively higher returns on
 domestic assets helped to increase the retained earnings and, consequently,
 the net worth of the banking system. As a result, the capital adequacy ratio in
 the sector reached to internationally acceptable levels.13
 The Effects of the 1994 Crisis on the Banking Sector
 Toward the end of 1993, the intention of a policy reversal of the government,
 namely, lower interest rate-higher depreciation, and cancellation of the Trea
 sury auctions compelled the banking system to an urgent rearrangement of
 foreign currency-denominated assets and liabilities. This very hasty adjust
 ment provoked the demand for foreign currency and started the events that
 eventually led the economy to the 1994 crisis. In January 1994, the Turkish
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 lira was devaluated around 13 percent. However, it did not help much to
 curb the extra demand for foreign currency and the Central Bank increased
 its lending rates. Although the devaluation was small, it destroyed the bal
 ance sheet of commercial banks. In order to alleviate the heavy burden of the
 short positions of commercial banks, the Central Bank and the state banks
 started to sell foreign currency to privately owned banks. After three months
 of turmoil, the government launched a stabilization program on April 5,1994,
 and devalued, in nominal terms, the Turkish lira by another 65 percent. The
 shift in the policy stance and accumulated structural defects of the vulner
 able banking system were the apparent reasons of the hard landing.14
 Almost all of the short positions of privately owned commercial banks
 were removed before April 5, 1994. Therefore, the effect of devaluation on
 these banks was limited. In addition, there was a substantial increase in the
 interest income of commercial banks. The ratio of net interest earnings to net
 interest expenses reached 2.5 in this period. The higher interest margin helped
 to cover the difference between noninterest expenses and noninterest income,
 and provided a reasonable net income for private banks. Also, a full-cover
 age insurance scheme for bank deposits was put into effect after launching
 the stabilization program on April 5, 1994. In spite of all of those measures,
 the burden of the crisis on commercial banks was very destructive, many
 banks came to the brink of losing their net worth, and three of them were
 liquidated. Capital adequacy ratios of all banks substantially diminished and
 the state banks lost 90 percent of their net worth. Credit expansion activities
 of the sector almost ceased and nonperforming loans increased 65 percent.
 The financial crisis in 1994 was a turning point for the state banks. Ertugrul
 and Zaim (1996) investigated the efficiency in the Turkish banking sector
 within the framework of neoclassical theory using nonparametric techniques.
 The study shows that there was a significant increase in the global efficiency
 of the system in terms of credit extension and deposit collection between
 1980 and 1993 and a decrease in 1994. These findings point out the positive
 effect of the liberalization efforts on the efficiency in the system. The study
 also indicates that the state banks were more efficient than the private banks
 in terms of credit extension and deposit collection during 1981-1993. Under
 the constant-returns-to-scale assumption, the inefficiency index of the state
 banks decreased from 10.7 percent to 4.1 percent, and the inefficiency index
 of the privately owned banks fell from 24.5 percent to 13.7 during the same
 period. The inefficiency index of private banks in general is above the state
 banks. However, the speed of improvement in private banks is remarkable.
 After the crisis in 1994, private banks became more efficient than the
 state banks in terms of credit extension and deposit collection. The ineffi
 ciency of the state banks stems from the implicit resource allocation decision
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 Table 2
 Net Income-Average Total Assets Ratio (NI-ATA); Net Interest Income
 Average Total Assets Ratio (NII-ATA) (in percent)
 _1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
 NI-ATA
 Privately owned 0.39 3.8 5.7 5.8 4.8 5.6 5.6
 banks
 State banks 3.1 -0.1 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.5
 NII-ATA
 Privately owned 11.2 12.4 11.5 12.5 13.2 14.9 12.3
 banks
 State banks 8.7 7.9 2.9 6.2 4.2 4.9 3.7
 Source: Banks Association of Turkey.
 of the government. As mentioned before, the state banks lost almost 90 per
 cent of their net worth during the 1994 crisis. Devaluation and the new mea
 sures taken by the government negatively affected the income statement of
 these banks. The ratio of net income to total assets declined from 3.1 percent
 in 1993 to -0.1 percent in 1994, and remained well below the same ratio for
 the private banks in the following years. The net interest margin of privately
 owned banks was roughly three times larger than the net interest margin of
 the state banks (see Table 2).
 The state-owned commercial banks extended concessionary credits to the
 agricultural sector, small- and medium-sized enterprises, and the housing
 sector. In spite of the increasing market interest rates for fund-raising, these
 banks were not able to change their traditional loan extending policies and
 could not reduce the volume of concessionary loans. The total burden of this
 credit policy and some quasi-fiscal duties on the state banks reached $20
 billion at the end of 2000. These "duty losses" were slightly above 10 per
 cent of the GDP and 14 percent of the total assets of the banking system. An
 inadequate reimbursement of the Undersecretariat of the Treasury concern
 ing the duty losses increased the liquidity and capital adequacy problems of
 the state-owned banks. As a result, the cost of fund-raising for these banks
 increased. The practice of extra interest offerings by the state banks to attract
 deposits created distortions in the market.
 In sum, the measures taken during and after the 1994 stabilization program
 could not relieve the vulnerability of the banking system. The governments
 and the commercial banks returned to the alluring hot money policy immedi
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 ately after the 1994 crisis, that is, short-term borrowing from abroad and lending
 at home as a result of hefty profit margins on the Treasury bills and govern
 ment bonds in dollar terms (see Figure 8). Due to large fiscal deficits and
 extensive government borrowing, higher interest rates induced the banking
 sector engage heavily in deficit financing, neglecting the market risk, ex
 change-rate risk, and proper management of assets and liabilities. The exces
 sive risk-taking behavior of privately owned banks increased the vulnerability
 of the system against even small shocks. Protracted fiscal imbalances, inad
 equate regulation and supervision of the banking system, poor risk manage
 ment, and implicit and explicit government guarantees, prevented the provision
 of the preconditions of a sound financial system.
 The Stabilization Program in 2000 and the Banking Sector
 In July 1998, the Turkish government started to implement a disinflation
 program under the guidance of an IMF Staff Monitored Program. The pro
 gram achieved some improvements concerning inflation rate and fiscal im
 balances, but it could not relieve the pressures on the interest rates. The Rus
 sian crisis in August 1998, the general elections in April 1999, and two dev
 astating earthquakes in August and October 1999 deteriorated the fiscal bal
 ance of the public sector. The relative share of primary surplus in the GDP
 decreased and the ratio of public debt to GDP kept increasing. Another IMF
 backed disinflation program was launched in December 1999. The program
 was preloaded with several structural changes. Among other measures, a
 new banking law was enacted in June 1999, and later modified in December
 1999 before the program was launched. An independent Banking Regula
 tion and Supervision Agency (BRSA) was established with this law. The
 new banking law stipulates many rules and principles that are compatible
 with the regulation and supervision standards of the Basel committee. In this
 regard, qualifications and responsibilities of the main shareholders were re
 arranged, new provisions concerning credit extension and fund-raising ac
 tivities were accepted, the minimum capital requirement and capital adequacy
 were redefined in accordance with the Bank for International Settlements
 (BIS) regulations, and actions that will be taken by the BRSA for bank fail
 ures were determined. Just before launching the stabilization program, five
 privately owned insolvent banks were taken under the control of the Savings
 Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF).
 In the Letter of Intent dated December 9, 1999, a special emphasis is
 given to the restructuring of the banking sector. Under the title of "Strength
 ening the Banking System and Banking Regulation," the government com
 mitted to carry out necessary amendments for providing full autonomy to the
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 BRSA and strengthening the prudential standards for lending. Furthermore,
 the government declared the new regulations about capital adequacy, loan
 loss provisions, and foreign exchange exposure limits. All of these measures
 aim at providing the appropriate prudential requirements in line with the
 international standards.
 In addition to these new regulatory efforts, the government undertook
 some measures to remove the distortions created by the state-owned banks.
 Commercialization of the Ziraat Bank, Halk Bank, and Emlak Bank, and
 their eventual privatization, took a special action plan.
 Most of the actions that will be taken to strengthen the banking system were
 considered as performance criteria for a stand-by arrangement, and the gov
 ernment intended to fully implement them according to a special timetable.
 New regulations regarding reserve requirement, liquidity ratio, loan-loss
 provisions, and their amendments were put into effect in 2000. The special
 law on the privatization of state-owned banks, Ziraat Bank, Halk Bank, and
 Emlak Bank was amended. Shortly after undertaking, the management of
 two commercial banks by the BRSA, a new action plan for the banks under
 the management of the SDIF was announced.
 Crisis in the Middle of the Road
 Despite the fact that the program achieved some remarkable results in a short
 period of time, the Turkish financial system experienced a short-lived crisis
 at the end of 2000. During the second half of 2000, the slowdown in eco
 nomic reforms in general, and the opposition to the privatization of certain
 state enterprises from inside the government, increased the suspicion in the
 market that the program was about to end.
 It was very well known in the market that one of the commercial banks,
 Demirbank, had an extremely risky position. The bank had a substantial
 government securities portfolio, financed through short-term borrowing from
 the money market.15 Due to difficulties in borrowing from the money market
 on November 20, 2000, Demirbank started to fire sale government bonds in
 order to obtain liquidity. Similar actions by the marketmakers in govern
 ment securities pushed the interest rates up further and the marketmakers
 stopped posting prices. The turmoil in the market promoted expectations of an
 immediate devaluation and triggered an inverse movement of short-term capi
 tal.16 A liquidity pressure as a result of the heavy capital outflow and decrease
 in the Central Bank reserves rocketed the interest rates. The Central Bank
 started to provide liquidity to the market, violating the rule set by the stand-by
 agreement for the net domestic assets. However, the additional liquidity
 bounced back in the form of additional demand for foreign currency. There
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 fore, the Central Bank stopped providing liquidity and overnight interest
 rates (simple annual) reached to its peak at 800 percent on December 4,
 2000.17 The financial turmoil forced a set of urgent measures. The govern
 ment requested the completion of the third and fourth program reviews and
 asked for access to the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) of the IMF.
 The IMF "emergency" team in Ankara and the government officials an
 nounced on December 5, 2000, that the IMF was considering an additional
 $7.5 billion loan to Turkey to support the ongoing program. The same day,
 before the markets opened, Demirbank was undertaken by the SDIF, ten
 days after the crisis started.
 With an additional Letter of Intent to the IMF, the government committed
 to take additional actions regarding public finance, privatization, agriculture
 sector, income policy, monetary, and exchange policies. Most of the new
 steps, policy formulations and regulations, are parallel to those stipulated in
 the first Letter of Intent, dated December 9, 1999. However, the new letter
 stresses the importance of the policies and specifies the dates of almost each
 additional measure. The letter also emphasizes restoration of the confidence
 in the banking and financial system. In this regard, it is promised that a com
 prehensive system of guarantee for depositors and other creditors to the banks
 will be established, necessary measures will be taken for the resolution of
 ten banks that are under the management of the SDIF, an appropriate regula
 tion and supervision mechanism will be put into effect for keeping the bank
 ing system sound, and necessary actions will be taken for the
 commercialization and privatization of state-owned banks.
 On December 22, 2000, the request of the Turkish government was ac
 cepted by the IMF Board, and additional financial support was assumed in
 terms of access to the SRF. Specifically, the Board announced that an addi
 tional $7.5 billion would be provided to Turkey in several installments. The
 reverse capital flow took place immediately (especially in the beginning of the
 year), and the Central Bank's reserves returned to its precrisis level. Interest
 rates decreased, albeit stabilizing at a higher level than the precrisis average.
 Preliminary developments in the money market and the bond market in
 dicate that confidence in the economy was restored. However, dependence
 on the short-term capital flows and the vulnerability of the banking sector
 signals the possibility of a new crisis. The liquidity creation mechanism stipu
 lated in the stand-by arrangement requires sizable capital inflows. The poor
 performance of the economy in attracting the long-term capital in the form
 of a direct investment makes the short-term capital flows and external bor
 rowing more important than before. Ironically, the success of the disinflation
 program and the stability of the banking system now depends on short-term
 capital inflow, although the program aimed to put the economy on a sustain
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 able growth path. Clearly, this creates a very fragile financial system, as it is
 unsustainable to rely on short-term capital flows in the long run.
 Conclusion
 The history of the Turkish economy for the last twenty years might be ana
 lyzed in two distinct periods: export-led growth period (1980-1988) and a
 volatile growth period during which the economy became dependent on the
 short-term capital flows, thanks to an alluring "hot money policy" (1989
 1999). The recent restructuring and reform program aims at reducing infla
 tion to single digits and putting the economy into a sustainable growth path.
 A short-lived financial crisis during the course of the program showed that
 the financial system is very fragile. Ironically, the latest crisis also made it
 clear that the continuation of the disinflation program and the stability of the
 banking system in the short run depend on short-term capital inflows. Unless
 the Turkish Government creates an environment in which the foreign direct
 investment finds itself comfortable, the program is destined to fail like the
 previous programs.
 Notes
 1. See Selguk and Yeldan (2001) for an evaluation of the macroeconomic effect
 of the August 1999 earthquake.
 2. Tezel (1994) is a standard reference on the Turkish economic history up to
 1950. See Aricanli and Rodrik (1990), ?nis and Riedel (1993), and the references
 therein, for a detailed account of the Turkish macroeconomic experience during 1951?
 1987. For recent years, see Selguk (1997) and other chapters in Rittenberg (1998).
 Yeldan (1997,1998) analyzes the Turkish economy with computable general equilib
 rium (CGE) models from a political economy viewpoint. Similarly, ?nis and Aysan
 (2000) conduct a comparative analysis of financial crises in Turkey, Mexico, and East
 Asian economies from a political economic perspective.
 3. Selguk (1997) shows that Turkey was not able to smooth consumption after
 1987 and the realized consumption was more volatile than an estimated optimum
 consumption.
 4. See Togan (1995) for a review of the trade policy of Turkey. More recently,
 Togan (2001) reviews the openness of the Turkish economy in relation to the Euro
 pean Union. For the real exchange rate developments, see Agenor et al. (1997) and
 Erlat and Erlat (1998).
 5. The external balance figures are taken from the GDP components of the na
 tional income statistics, estimated by the State Institute of Statistics. The current ac
 count of the balance-of-payments statistics may give different results. For example,
 the large inflow of official unrequited transfers in 1990 and 1991 reduced the other
 wise large current account deficit. These, and similar unrequited transfers, should be
 excluded from the external balance analysis of an economy, unless they have a per
 manent nature.
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 6. Especially after 1993, there is a substantial foreign exchange flow into the
 economy and the source of this flow is officially unknown. The Central Bank views
 this unknown inflow as current account income. It was classified under the "Other
 Income, Other" item in the balance-of-payment statistics for a long period of time.
 Recently, a new category?shuttle trade?is added to the balance-of-payments. This
 item includes estimated unofficial exports, mainly to the former Soviet Union coun
 tries. However, there is no estimate of unofficial imports in the balance-of-pay
 ments of Turkey. The total amount of unofficial exports and imports, as well as
 unofficial foreign exchange transfers from external services, are difficult to esti
 mate. A recent Letter of Intent to the IMF points out this problem: "In the period
 ahead, the institutional capacity to compile balance of payment statistics needs to
 be strengthened, in light of the difficulties in this area encountered in recent years
 (especially regarding the external service accounts)" (Letter of Intent, December
 18,2000, paragraph 61).
 7. For a measure of the overall public sector deficit and borrowing requirement,
 the losses of the state banks and the Central Bank must also be included in the PSBR
 definition above. For example, accumulated duty losses of the state banks reached to
 $20 billion in 2000 (approximately 11 percent of the GDP) and the state banks have
 registered significant losses in recent years. Developments in the banking sector will
 be investigated in the fifth section.
 8. See Berument and Malatyah (2000) for an analysis of the Central Bank poli
 cies in recent years.
 9. The second period corresponds to the tenure of current Governor Gazi Ercel.
 He was appointed April 17, 1996.
 10. In terms of the sample coefficient of variation (CV), the volatile period had a
 CV of 0.36 and a less-volatile period had a CV of 0.10. The same statistic for the
 program period is 0.36.
 11. Celasun (2001) reports the privatization policies and the privatization perfor
 mance of Turkey between 1985 and 1995.
 12. The sudden jump in these ratios in 1999 was a direct consequence of a deep
 recession, and, consequently, a drop in GNP.
 13. According to the Basel accord, if the ratio of total capital to borrowed resources
 is over 8 percent, the capital adequacy ratio is generally accepted as satisfactory.
 14. See ?zatay (1996) for an analysis of the 1994 crisis from a public mismanage
 ment point of view.
 15. It is estimated that Demirbank (paid capital $300 million) had approximately
 $7.5 billion of government securities (almost 15 percent of the total domestic debt stock).
 16. Dornbusch (2001) claims that a large number of bad banks and the banking
 system's short-term funding caused the crisis in Turkey. Stanley Fischer, first deputy
 managing director of the IMF, relates the crisis in Turkey to banking sector problems
 and the failure to undertake corrective fiscal actions against the widening current
 account deficit (see Fischer 2001).
 17. This rate is a weighted average of interest rates in the money market. The
 highest and the lowest (simple annual) overnight interest rates were 300 percent and
 1,950 percent, respectively, during this period.
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